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On the Exponential Rate of Convergence of
Fictitious Play in Potential Games
Brian Swenson and Soummya Kar
Abstract—The paper studies fictitious play (FP) learning dy-
namics in continuous time. It is shown that in almost every
potential game, and for almost every initial condition, the rate of
convergence of FP is exponential. In particular, the paper focuses
on studying the behavior of FP in potential games in which all
equilibria of the game are regular, as introduced by Harsanyi.
Such games are referred to as regular potential games. Recently
it has been shown that almost all potential games (in the sense
of the Lebesgue measure) are regular. In this paper it is shown
that in any regular potential game (and hence, in almost every
potential game), FP converges to the set of Nash equilibria at an
exponential rate from almost every initial condition.
Index Terms—Game theory, Learning, Potential games, Ficti-
tious play, Multi-agent systems, Best-response dynamics
I. INTRODUCTION
Multi-agent systems are naturally modeled using the math-
ematical framework of game theory [1]. In recent years
there has been a surge of research investigating the use of
game-theoretic learning processes as a means of controlling
multi-agent systems in a decentralized manner (see [2] and
references therein). Application domains include, but are
not limited to, wireless networks [3], [4]; the smart grid
infrastructure [5]; distributed traffic routing [6]–[8]; electric
vehicle charging networks [9]; mobile sensor networks [10];
and wind farm management [11], [12]. From an engineering
perspective, if game-theoretic learning processes are to be used
as decentralized control algorithms in such systems, then it is
of paramount importance to understand the rate at which such
processes converge to equilibrium.
One of the best-known and most prototypical game theoretic
learning processes is known as fictitious play (FP) [13], [14].
In FP, each player adjusts their personal strategy towards a
myopic best response given the current strategy of opponents.
(See Section II for a formal definition.) Since Nash equilibria
(NE) are defined as the fixed points of the best response
mapping, FP dynamics can be regarded as the “natural”
learning dynamics associated with the NE concept [15], [16].
Despite its prototypical role, there are relatively few rigor-
ous results characterizing the rate of convergence of FP [17]–
[19]. In particular, there are no general results characterizing
the rate of convergence of FP in the important class of multi-
agent games known as potential games [20].
In a potential game, there exists some underlying potential
function (the structure of which may be unknown to agents)
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that all players implicitly seek to optimize. Potential games
are particularly important in the study of decentralized control
algorithms [21] and have a wide range of applications in the
field of multi-agent systems [7], [10], [22]–[30].
The main contribution of this paper is to show that the
rate of convergence of FP is almost always exponential in
potential games. In particular, we will show that in almost
every potential game and for almost every initial condition,
the rate of convergence of FP is exponential (see Theorem 8
for a precise statement of our main result).12
We note that there are some fundamental challenges that
arise when trying to establish convergence rate estimates for
FP in potential games. As pointed out by Harris [17], if (the
trajectory of) an FP process in a potential game intersects
with a mixed-strategy equilibrium, then it may rest there for
an indeterminate amount of time before moving elsewhere.
Consequently, solutions of FP in potential games may be non-
unique and it is impossible to establish general convergence
rate estimates in such games.
In order to overcome these difficulties, the proof of our
main result relies crucially on several recent advancements
in the study of FP and potential games. The notion of a
regular Nash equilibrium was introduced by Harsanyi [33].
Such equilibria are relatively simple to analyze and posses a
variety of useful robustness properties. A game is said to be
regular if all equilibria in the game are regular. While not
all potential games are regular, it has recently been shown
that almost every potential game is regular [34]. The work
[16] studied convergence properties of FP in regular potential
games. In particular, in [16] it was shown that (i) in a regular
potential game, FP converges to a pure strategy NE from
almost every initial condition,3 and (ii) in any regular potential
game, solutions of FP are unique for almost every initial
condition.
We will prove Theorem 8 by studying FP in regular potential
games and leveraging these two properties.
We remark that conjectures have been made regarding the
rate of convergence of FP in potential games, though no
1We note that in this paper we study the autonomous variant of
continuous-time FP, e.g., [31], [32]. Convergence rate estimates for the non-
autonomous variant of continuous-time FP can be derived from these estimates
using a time change [17].
2When we say that a property holds for “almost every” potential game
(initial condition), we mean that the set of potential games (initial conditions)
where the property fails to hold has Lebesgue measure zero. See Sections
II-B and III for more details.
3In particular, in any regular potential game, the set of initial conditions
from which a mixed-strategy equilibrium can be reached by an FP process
has Lebesgue measure zero.
2rigorous proofs have yet been given. In particular, Harris
conjectured that the rate of convergence of FP is exponential
in any weighted potential game ([17], Conjecture 25). Our
results partially resolve this conjecture. We show that Harris’s
conjecture holds for almost every initial condition in almost
every exact potential game.4 Our results are less broad than
Harris’s conjecture in the sense that we consider a smaller
class of games (exact potential games) and only prove the
result for almost every initial condition. However, our result
also makes a stronger statement than encountered in Harris’s
conjecture in the sense that Harris assumed the constants in the
convergence rate estimate would need to be path dependent.
We show that for almost every initial condition, the constant
in the convergence rate estimate is uniquely determined by the
initial condition. See Remark 9 for more details.
The remainder of the paper is devoted to proving Theorem
8. Section II sets up notation and formally defines the FP learn-
ing process. Section III introduces regular potential games.
Section IV reviews relevant results regarding FP in regular
potential games. Section V states our main result (Theorem 8)
and proves the same. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation
A game in normal form is represented by the tuple
Γ := (N, (Yi, ui)i=1,...,N ), where N ∈ {2, 3, . . .} denotes the
number of players, Yi = {y
1
i , . . . , y
Ki
i } denotes the set of pure
strategies (or actions) available to player i, with cardinality
Ki := |Yi|, and ui :
∏N
j=1 Yj → R denotes the utility function
of player i. Denote by Y :=
∏N
i=1 Yi the set of joint pure
strategies, and let K :=
∏N
i=1Ki denote the number of joint
pure strategies.
For a finite set S, let △(S) denote the set of probability
distributions over S. For i = 1, . . . , N , let ∆i := △(Yi)
denote the set of mixed-strategies available to player i. Let
∆ :=
∏N
i=1∆i denote the set of joint mixed strategies.
5 Let
∆−i :=
∏
j∈{1,...,N}\{i}∆j . When convenient, given a mixed
strategy σ = (σ1, . . . , σN ) ∈ ∆, we use the notation σ−i to
denote the tuple (σj)j 6=i.
Given a mixed strategy σ ∈ ∆, the expected utility of player
i is given by
Ui(σ1, . . . , σN ) =
∑
y∈Y
ui(y)σ1(y1) · · ·σN (yN ).
For σ−i ∈ ∆−i, the best response of player i is given by
the set-valued function BRi : ∆−i ⇒ ∆i,
BRi(σ−i) := arg max
σ′
i
∈∆i
Ui(σ
′
i, σ−i),
and for σ ∈ ∆ the joint best response is given by the set
valued function BR : ∆⇒ ∆
BR(σ) := BR1(σ−1)× · · · × BRN (σ−N ).
4Exact potential games are a subset of weighted potential games [20].
Unless otherwise specified, when referring to a “potential game” throughout
the paper, we mean an exact potential game.
5It is implicitly assumed that players’ mixed strategies are independent,
i.e., players do not coordinate.
A strategy σ ∈ ∆ is said to be a Nash equilibrium (NE) if
σ ∈ BR(σ). For convenience, we sometimes refer to a Nash
equilibrium simply as an equilibrium.
We say that Γ is a potential game [20] if there exists a
function u : Y → R such that ui(y
′
i, y−i) − ui(y
′′
i , y−i) =
u(y′i, y−i)− u(y
′′
i , y−i) for all y−i ∈ Y−i and y
′
i, y
′′
i ∈ Yi, for
all i = 1, . . . , N .
Let U : ∆ → R be the multilinear extension of u defined
by
U(σ1, . . . , σN ) =
∑
y∈Y
u(y)σ1(y1) · · ·σ(yN ). (1)
The function U may be seen as giving the expected value of
u under the mixed strategy σ.
Using the definitions of Ui and U , it is straightforward to
verify that
BRi(σ−i) := arg max
σi∈∆i
Ui(σi, σ−i) = arg max
σi∈∆i
U(σi, σ−i).
Thus, in order to compute the best response set, we only
require knowledge of the potential function U , not necessarily
the individual utility functions (Ui)i=1,...,N .
By way of notation, given a pure strategy yi ∈ Yi and
a mixed strategy σ−i ∈ ∆−i, we will write U(yi, σ−i) to
indicate the value of U when player i uses a mixed strategy
placing all weight on the yi and the remaining players use the
strategy σ−i ∈ ∆−i.
Given a σi ∈ ∆i, let σ
k
i denote the value of the k-th entry
in σi, so that σi = (σ
k
i )
Ki
k=1. Since the potential function is
linear in each σi, if we fix any i = 1, . . . , N we may express
it as
U(σ) =
Ki∑
k=1
σki U(y
k
i , σ−i). (2)
Throughout the paper we will use the following nomencla-
ture to describe equilibrium strategies.
Definition 1. (i) If an equilibrium strategy σ ∈ ∆ places all
its mass on a single action tuple y = (y1, . . . , yN) ∈ Y , then
we refer to σ as a pure-strategy equilibrium.
(ii) If an equilibrium strategy σ ∈ ∆ is not a pure-strategy
equilibrium, then we say it is a mixed-strategy equilibrium.
The following definition gives a refinement of the Nash
equilibrium concept applicable to pure-strategy equilibria.
Definition 2. If σ ∈ ∆ is a pure-strategy equilibrium placing
mass on the action tuple y = (y1, . . . , yN ) ∈ Y , and there
holds
u(yi, y−i) > u(y
′
i, y−i)
for all y′i ∈ Yi, y
′
i 6= yi, i = 1, . . .N , then we say that σ is a
strict pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
If an equilibrium strategy is not pure, then it cannot be
strict. The following definition gives a relaxation of the notion
of strictness that applies more generally to mixed-strategy
equilibria.
Definition 3. We say that an equilibrium strategy σ ∈ ∆
is quasi-strict if for every i = 1, . . . , N , every pure strategy
yi ∈ BRi(σ−i) is also in the support of σi.
3We note that if σ is a pure-strategy equilibrium, then σ is
strict if and only if it is quasi-strict.
In order to study learning dynamics without being (directly)
encumbered by the hyperplane constraint inherent in ∆i we
define
Xi := {xi ∈ R
Ki−1 : 0 ≤ xki ≤ 1 for k = 1, . . . ,Ki − 1,
and
Ki−1∑
k=1
xki ≤ 1},
where we use the convention that xki denotes the k-th entry
in xi so that xi = (x
k
i )
Ki−1
k=1 .
Given xi ∈ Xi define the bijective mapping Ti : Xi → ∆i
as
Ti(xi) = σi (3)
for the unique σi ∈ ∆i such that σ
k
i = x
k−1
i for k = 2, . . . ,Ki
and σ1i = 1 −
∑Ki−1
k=1 x
k
i . For k = 1, . . . ,Ki let T
k
i be the
k-th component map of Ti so that Ti = (T
k
i )
Ki
i=1.
LetX := X1×· · ·×XN and let T : X → ∆ be the bijection
given by T = T1 × · · · × TN . In an abuse of terminology,
we sometimes refer to X as the mixed-strategy space of Γ.
When convenient, given an x ∈ X we use the notation x−i to
denote the tuple (xj)j 6=i. Letting X−i :=
∏
j 6=iXj , we define
T−i : X−i → ∆−i as T−i := (Tj)j 6=i. Let
κ :=
N∑
i=1
(|Yi| − 1) (4)
denote the dimension of X , and note that κ 6= K , where K ,
defined earlier, is the cardinality of the joint pure strategy set
Y .
Throughout the paper we often find it convenient to work
in X rather than ∆. In order to keep the notation as simple as
possible we overload the definitions given above, modifying
all definitions given for strategies σ ∈ ∆ modus mutandis
using the bijective relationships T : X → ∆, Ti : Xi → ∆i
and T−i → ∆−i. In particular, we let BRi : X−i ⇒ Xi be
defined by
BRi(x−i) := {xi ∈ Xi : BRi(σ−i) = σi, σi ∈ ∆i,
σ−i ∈ ∆−i, σi = Ti(xi), σ−i = T−i(x−i)}.
Similarly, given an x ∈ X we write U(x) instead of U(T (x)),
and we say a strategy x ∈ X satisfies a given property (e.g.,
x is a pure-strategy, strict, or quasi-strict equilibrium) if the
corresponding strategy σ = T (x) ∈ ∆ satisfies the property.
Given a pure strategy yi ∈ Yi, we will write U(yi, x−i) to
indicate the value of U when player i uses a mixed strategy
placing all weight on the yi and the remaining players use the
strategy x−i ∈ X−i. Similarly, we will say y
k
i ∈ BRi(x−i) if
there exists an xi ∈ BRi(x−i) such that Ti(xi) places weight
one on yki .
Applying the definition of Ti to (2), we see that U(x) may
also be expressed as
U(x) =
Ki−1∑
k=1
xki U(y
k+1
i , x−i) +
(
1−
Ki−1∑
k=1
xki
)
U(y1i , x−i).
(5)
for any i = 1, . . . , N .
Other notation as used throughout the paper is as follows:
• N := {1, 2, . . .}.
• Ln, n ∈ {1, 2, . . .} refers to the n-dimensional Lebesgue
measure.
B. Fictitious Play
A fictitious play process is formally defined as follows.
Definition 4. An absolutely-continuous mapping x : R → X
is said to be a fictitious play process with initial condition
x0 ∈ X if x(0) = x0 and
x˙ ∈ BR(x)− x (6)
holds for almost every t ∈ R.
Given a game Γ, we say that FP satisfies a property for
almost every initial condition if the set of initial conditions
from which the property fails to hold has Lκ-measure zero.
III. REGULAR POTENTIAL GAMES
The notion of a “regular” Nash equilibrium was introduced
by Harsanyi [33]. Regular equilibria have been studied exten-
sively in the literature (see [35] and references therein), and
have been shown to possess a wide range of desirable sta-
bility and robustness properties. Among other things, regular
equilibria are quasi-strict [33], [35]; perfect [36]; proper [37];
strongly stable [38]; essential [39]; and isolated [35].6
In addition to their robustness properties, regular equilibria
possess an inherently simple analytic structure, which can be
quite useful in the study of game-theoretic learning algorithms.
For example, the simple structural properties of regular equi-
libria were used in a critical way to facilitate the study of FP
learning dynamics in [16].
A game is said to be regular if all equilibria in the game
are regular. In this paper we will focus our study on potential
games that are regular.
The set of potential games is isomorphic to RKp , where
Kp := (
∑N
i=1
∏
j 6=iKj) + N + K − 1, [34]. We say that
almost every potential games possesses a certain property if
the set of games where the property fails to hold has LKp -
measure zero. Regular potential games were studied in [34],
where the following result was proved.
Theorem 5 ( [34], Theorem 1). Almost every potential game
is regular.
The following lemma gives a useful property of pure-
strategy equilibria in regular potential games that will be useful
in the proof of our main result.
Lemma 6. Let x∗ ∈ X be a pure-strategy equilibrium of a
regular potential game. Then for all x ∈ X in a neighborhood
of x∗ there holds
BR(x) = {x∗}; (7)
6For a simple flowchart demonstrating the interrelationships between
these concepts, the reader may refer to the survey diagrams found in the
appendix of [35].
4that is, the pure-strategy equilibrium x∗ is the unique best
response to every x in a neighborhood of x∗.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that the strategy set
Yi := {y
1
i , . . . , y
Ki
i } of each player i = 1, . . . , N is reordered
so that y1i ∈ BRi(x
∗
−i).
In [35] it is shown that every regular equilibrium is quasi-
strict. In particular, this implies that the regular pure-strategy
equilibrium x∗ is strict, i.e.,
U(y1i , x
∗
−i) > U(y
k+1
i , x
∗
−i), (8)
for all i = 1, . . . , N , k = 1, . . . ,Ki. Differentiating (5) we
see that
∂U(x∗)
∂xki
= U(yk+1i , x
∗
−i)− U(y
1
i , x
∗
−i) < 0.
for all i = 1, . . . , N , k = 1, . . . ,Ki, where the inequality
follows from (8). Since the gradient of U is continuous, we
see that
∂U(x)
∂xki
= U(yk+1i , x−i)− U(y
1
i , x−i) < 0,
for all i = 1, . . . , N , k = 1, . . . ,Ki, and all x ∈ X in a
neighborhood of x∗. In particular, this gives U(y1i , x−i) >
U(yk+1i , x−i) for all i = 1, . . . , N , k = 1, . . . ,Ki, and all
x ∈ X in a neighborhood of x∗, which is the desired result.
IV. FICTITIOUS PLAY IN REGULAR POTENTIAL GAMES
It is known that FP can converge to mixed (but not pure)
equilibria in potential games [40]. This can be problematic
for several reasons. For one thing, mixed-strategy equilibria
necessarily occur at saddle points of the potential function,
which means that they do not maximize the potential function
and tend to be inherently unstable under learning dynamics.
At a more fundamental level, mixed equilibria are problem-
atic since an FP process may reach such an equilibrium in
finite time.7 In such an event, the FP process may rest at
the equilibrium for an indeterminate amount of time before
moving elsewhere. This results in non-uniqueness of solutions
and makes it impossible to establish general convergence rate
estimates for FP in potential games.
In [16] it was shown that these issues can be sidestepped by
focusing on the class of regular potential games. In particular,
we have the following results for FP in potential games.
Theorem 7. Let Γ be a regular potential game. Then,
(i) For almost every initial condition, FP converges to a
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. In particular, FP can only
reach mixed-strategy (non-pure) equilibria from a set of initial
conditions with Lκ-measure zero.
(ii) For almost every initial condition x0 ∈ X , there is a
unique FP process with x(0) = x0.
The first item is a restatement of Theorem 1 in [16]. The
second item follows from Remark 20 in [16]. These properties
will play a critical role in the proof of Theorem 8.
7In fact, in [16] it was shown that if an FP process converges to a
regular mixed equilibrium of a potential game, then the FP process necessarily
converges to the equilibrium in finite time. See [16], Section 5.2.
V. MAIN RESULT
Theorem 8. Let Γ be a regular potential game. Then for
almost every initial condition x0 ∈ X , there exists a constant
c = c(Γ, x0) such that if x is an FP process associated with
Γ and x(0) = x0, then
d(x(t), NE) ≤ ce−t. (9)
We note that the constant c in the above theorem is uniquely
determined by the game Γ and the initial condition x0. We now
prove Theorem 8.
Proof. Properties (i) and (ii) of Theorem 7 imply that there
exists a set Ω ⊂ X satisfying the following properties: (a)
Lκ(X\Ω) = 0, (b) for every FP process x with initial
condition x0 ∈ Ω, x is the unique FP process satisfying
x(0) = x0, and x converges to a pure-strategy NE.
Let x0 ∈ Ω, let x be an FP process with x(0) = x0, and let
x∗ be the pure-strategy NE to which x converges. Without loss
of generality, assume that the pure-strategy set Y is reordered
so that
x∗ = 0 (10)
(i.e., T 1i (x
∗
i ) = 1 for all i = 1, . . . , N , where T
k
i is defined
following (3)).
By Lemma 6, for all x in a neighborhood of x∗ we have
BR(x) = x∗. Since x(t)→ x∗, this, along with (6) and (10),
implies that there exists a time τ = τ(Γ, x0) > 0 such that
for all t ≥ τ , we have x˙(t) = −x(t). Hence, for t ≥ τ we
have ‖x(t)‖ = ‖x(τ)‖eτ−t. Letting c := supt∈[0,τ ] ‖x(t)‖e
τ
we get ‖x(t)‖ ≤ ce−t for all t ≥ 0.
Remark 9. Conjecture 25 of [17] posited that within the
class of weighted potential games, the rate of convergence
of any FP process x is exponential with coefficient c (cf. (9))
depending on the game Γ and the particular FP process x;
i.e., c = c(Γ,x). In Theorem 8 we showed this is true in
almost every exact potential game and for almost every initial
condition, and furthermore, we showed that, for almost every
initial condition, the constant c in (9) can be determined by
the initial condition alone, rather than depending on the full
path x; i.e., c = c(Γ, x0).
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The paper studied fictitious play learning dynamics in
continuous time. It was shown that in almost every potential
game (i.e., in every regular potential game [34]) the rate of
convergence of FP is generically exponential. The proof was
facilitated by the fact that FP has been shown to converge
generically to pure strategy equilibria in regular potential
games [16].
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